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The potential importance of the precautionary motive for saving has been noted in many
studies during the last decades. This paper examines the determination of precautionary sav-
ing when people have access to intra-family risk sharing. I show that, with uncertain future
income, altruism per se can induce time consistent, however, not necessarily ex ante efficient,
risk sharing between risk averse spouses. The more altruistic the couple is, the closer is the
solution to the efficient one. Also welfare and savings effects from social insurance turn out to
be sensitive to assumptions about family structure. For risk sharing couples, the introduction
of a compulsory insurance scheme may have substantially smaller effects on welfare and pre-
cautionary savings.
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1   Introduction
Since Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) many economists have paid attention to the precau-
tionary savings motive. People save not only to smooth consumption, but also because they
are uncertain about the future in one way or the other. The uncertainty could, among other
things, concern length of life, future earnings, medical expenses or cost of housing. There are
several empirical studies indicating that precautionary savings actually constitutes an impor-
tant fraction of total wealth accumulation.
1 If the insurance market is incomplete, a substitute
may be intra-family insurance, and it has also been concluded that the family often permits
some kind of insurance among its’ members.
2 A problem in many existing models of family
decision making is, however, that the resulting risk sharing may well be time inconsistent
when binding contracts are impossible to create and there are no self enforcing constraints. As
shown in this paper, that problem may be solved by taking altruism into account. Altruism per
se can make married couples share risk in a time consistent way.
When risk is shared with the spouse, uncertainty about future income may be less important
than if the individual is single. The probability that both spouses e.g. become unemployed is
likely to be much lower than the corresponding individual probability. (Of course, there may
be macro level risk that is impossible to reduce, even within the family) How much lower the
risk is for an individual that lives in a family depends, among other things, on how family
decisions are reached.
                                                
1 See e.g. Skinner (1988), Carroll (1994), Merrigan & Normandin (1996).
2 See e.g. Kotlikoff & Spivak (1981) and Becker (1991, chaps. 8 and 11), for theoretical reasoning and Merrigan
& Normandin (1996) and Gruber & Berry Cullen (1996) for empirical evidence. Also the extended family may
give rise to risk sharing, but e.g. Hayashi et al. (1996) reject full risk sharing between parent households and their
split-offs.2
There are various possible modes of family decision making. Often it is simply assumed that
the family maximises one common utility function and it is of no importance who earns the
money in the family. For this model to yield a time consistent solution, it requires full altruism
from at least one party
3 and/or that all consumption goods are public within the family where
everyone has the same preferences. Another way of decision making is a non-cooperative so-
lution. Both spouses maximise their utility unilaterally, taking the other’s actions as given.
The resulting Cournot-Nash solution is self-enforcing, but likely to be inefficient, and may be
reached with, as well as without altruism.
4
Spouses may also act co-operatively, and set up a contract that via e.g. a bargaining process
maximises some ex ante utility function
5. This process is efficient ex ante, and does not re-
quire altruism. It may, however, lead to time inconsistency, a problem which is often ne-
glected. Kotlikoff & Spivak (1981) concludes e.g. that selfish individuals may gain from risk
sharing within marriage when there is uncertainty about length of life. The two spouses agree
on a joint consumption path while both are alive, and the one who dies first bequeaths his or
her assets to the spouse. This arrangement maximises ex ante utility for both spouses, but with
lack of altruism, there is possibly a problem with time inconsistency, which is illustrated by an
example: If the husband does not care about his wife, it might be optimal for him to act as if
she will be the only beneficiary in his will, but in fact he gives the assets to someone else, a
                                                
3 An example where not all family members have to be altruistic to maximise a joint utility function is the Rotten
Kid Theorem, see e.g. Becker (1974 and 1991, chap. 8).
4 See e.g. Lindbeck & Weibull (1988), Kooreman & Kapteyn (1990) and Browning (1996).
5 See e.g. Kotlikoff & Spivak (1981) and Konrad & Lommerud (1996).3
fact that will not be discovered until he is dead, and hence the wife cannot punish him for de-
viating from the contract.
In this paper, I specifically explore the relationship between precautionary saving and altru-
ism. In a world with uncertain future income I show that altruism can enforce risk sharing
within the family, and thereby reduce the need for precautionary saving. The spouses share
risk to a larger extent the more they love each other. The presence of altruism and the as-
sumption that savings decisions in the family are made in a non-cooperative way, taking the
other’s actions as given, guarantee that the solution is ex post efficient and time consistent,
although it is not necessarily efficient ex ante.
6
The possibility of insurance within the family has obvious implications also for the effective-
ness of social insurance. Engen & Gruber (1995) empirically find large crowding-out effects
on precautionary saving from unemployment insurance, and also notice that the effects are
stronger for singles. This is very much in line with the theoretical results in this paper, where I
show that the magnitude of the crowding-out effects very much depends on family structure. If
people already are insured within the family, the introduction of social insurance may primar-
ily crowd out this existing insurance, and hence have smaller welfare effects than expected. I
show that the effects on savings behaviour and welfare from the introduction of compulsory
insurance turn out to be stronger if people are single than if they are altruistically risk sharing
couples.
                                                
6 The ex ante inefficiency is of the same kind as that studied by Lindbeck & Weibull (1988).4
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 I study precautionary saving
for a single individual. The individual lives for two periods, one in which income is certain,
and one in which there may be either employment with high income or unemployment with
low income. Section 3 considers a married mutually altruistic couple, who make savings deci-
sions in a non-cooperative way. Precautionary savings turn out to be smaller for a married
than for a single person, and less sensitive to increased risk. Sections 4 and 5 contain two ex-
tensions. In section 4 one of the spouses has a higher probability of becoming unemployed,
and section 5 studies the effects from compulsory insurance. I show that the effects on sav-
ings, as well as on welfare, from the introduction of social insurance are larger if people are
single, rather than married, completely risk sharing couples. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2   One single individual
Assume that there is an individual who lives for two periods. In the first he receives a certain
income, and in the second an uncertain one. He gets utility from consumption in the two peri-
ods according to a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion
7:
u e e
c c = - -
- - 1 1
1 2
q q
q q ,                (1)
where ct indicates consumption in period t and q is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
With the exponential utility function, q is also the coefficient of absolute prudence. Kimball
(1990) defines the measure of absolute prudence as representing the intensity of the precau-
tionary saving motive. The interest and discount rates are, for simplicity, equal to zero, but
according to Caballero (1991) such an assumption does not alter the result appreciably. In the
                                                
7 This is not the most realistic utility function generating precautionary saving, i.e.  ¢¢¢ > u c
t
( ) 0 , but unfortu-
nately more realistic utility functions make it impossible to get a closed-form solution to the present problem.5
first period there is a non-random income y1. Period-two income consists of two parts; one
non-random part  y and one random  ~ y , that may be high or low indicating, for example, em-
ployment or unemployment, an interpretation adopted throughout the paper:
y y y 2 = + ~ ,
where
~ y k = e1     with probability p,
and
~ y k = e 2      with probability (1-p).
k is a shift parameter, and pe1+(1-p)e2=0, so that the expected value of y2 is y . We think of
e1<0 as representing unemployment and e2>0 as representing employment. The part of y1
saved to period two is denoted s (with a perfect capital market s may well be negative), so that
the individual’s problem can be expressed as:
max 
s
y s s y k s y k
Eu
e pe p e
= - - -
-
- - - + + - + + q q e q e
q q q
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 1
 ,                (2)
where E is the expectations operator.
The resulting Euler condition can be reformulated as an expression for saving:
s











1 2 ln ( )
q e q e
q
               (3)
The first term reflects ordinary consumption smoothing, while the second term is positive
8
and expresses precautionary saving.
Because of the precautionary savings motive, savings increase when there is a mean preserv-
ing increase in risk (an increase in k):
                                                
8 This follows since  pe p e e e
k k k p p - - - + - + - > = =
q e q e q e e 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 0 ( )
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where I have used the fact that pe1+(1-p) e2=0.
It is also trivially true that:
Proposition 1: Utility is lower under uncertainty than under certainty.
Proof: The discrepancy between utility under certainty and the expected utility under uncer-
tainty is measured in terms of the Equivalent Precautionary Premium (EPP)
9. EPP is the re-
duction in nonrandom period-two income that makes the individual optimally choose the
same amount of savings as in the uncertain case. Higher precautionary savings rates thereby
corresponds to higher values of EPP. The measure is derived and further discussed in Appen-
dix A. If EPP is positive this indicates that income risk decreases utility. EPP derived from
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Hence utility under uncertainty is lower than under certainty.  ￿
3   Altruism
Now consider a married, mutually altruistic couple, A and B, both with earnings and utility
functions as described in section 2. The spouses have identical incomes y1 in period one and
identical, but independent income structures  y y + ~ in period two. Furthermore they have the7
same altruistic concern for each other, a concern represented by the parameter 0£g£1 in their
respective utility function:
  EU Eu Eu i i j = +g                (5)
where ui is utility from own consumption, henceforth called private utility, defined in (1) for
i=A, B, j„i
10
Besides own private utility, the utility function hence includes the private utility of the spouse,
weighted by the altruism parameter g. The one extreme is that one does not care at all about
the spouse (g=0), and the other is that both have the same weight in the expected utility func-
tion (g=1).
11 A and B unilaterally maximise their own utility according to (5), but because of
altruism they both consider the other’s utility while doing so. They also take the other’s ac-
tions as given. In period two, when the states of employment or unemployment are known, it
is possible for spouses to give non-negative transfers to each other in order to smooth incomes
and thereby increase utility (a transfer from A to B is labelled TA and a transfer from B to A is
labelled TB). Negative transfers are ruled out, because one cannot take money from the spouse.
The whole sequence can be seen as a two-stage game with a resulting Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium. In the first period both spouses unilaterally decides how much of their income they are
going to save, and in the second period they may either remain employed or become unem-
ployed, and then decide whether or not to transfer some amount to the spouse. To achieve the
                                                                                                                                                        
9 This measure was first introduced by Kimball (1990). In Appendix A it is further discussed.
10 It is really a philosophic issue whether this is the correct utility form, or if it should be EUi=Eui+gEUj, but for
g=1, a transfer between the spouses would lead to infinite utility for both with the latter form. If g<1, the two
formulations are behaviourally equivalent . Lindbeck & Weibull (1988) discuss this matter.
11 I exclude the cases g<0, which would imply disutility from the spouse’s utility, and g>1, where one loves the
spouse more than one loves oneself.8
subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by backwards induction. In period two there
are four possible outcomes:
I  With probability p
2 both A and B become unemployed and receive income  y k + e1.
II With probability p(1-p) A becomes unemployed, receiving  y k + e1, while B stays employed
with income  y k + e 2 .
III With probability p(1-p) A stays employed and receives  y k + e 2 , while B becomes unem-
ployed with income  y k + e1.
IV With probability (1-p)
2 both A and B remain employed and receive income  y k + e 2 .
In each case both spouses have to decide if a transfer should be made to the other, and how
large such a transfer should be. In cases I and IV, where the outcome is the same for both
spouses no transfers are made.
12
In case II, where A receives  y k + e1, while B gets  y k + e 2  the problem for A is, in utility
terms:
max
( ) ( )
T A
s y k T T s y k T T
A











,              (6)
                                                
12 If A (and equivalently B) maximises period two utility with respect to the transfer TA  possibly given to B, the
resulting Kuhn-Tucker conditions make it obvious that if g<1 both spouses want to make a smaller transfer than
the other, and hence TA=TB=0 is the only possible solution. If g=1 both spouses always want to make identical
transfers, so all TA=TB  are solutions to the problem, but the net effect is equivalent to TA=TB=09
where U A
2  is the period-two utility for A, si is i’s savings from period one and Ti is the transfer
given from i to j for i=A, B, j„i.
Because spouses are identical, their savings from period one are equal and denoted by sm
where subscript m indicates a married person, i.e. sA=sB=sm. The savings decisions are made
in period one, so in period two sm is treated as a state variable. The first-order conditions from
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 Assume TB=0. Then (7a) gives T
k
A ‡ -




2 1 . If TA>0 this expression must hold with
equality, which immediately gives a contradiction, since 









. Hence TA=0 is
the only possibility if TB=0. From (8a) we see that TB =TA =0 requires that altruism is so weak
that g
q e e £
- - e
k( ) 2 1 .10
If instead g
q e e >
- - e
k( ) 2 1 and TB>0, (8a) implies:
T T
k
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Furthermore assume TA>0. (7a) then implies T T
k





2 1 b g
. Inserting (9) into
this expression gives 
lng
q
= 0, which is false for g<1. Hence the solution must be TA=0 also
when TB>0 for g<1. If g=1 there is an infinity of solutions. All combinations of TA and TB sat-
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for all values of g
q e e >
- - e
k( ) 2 1 , why this is assumed to be the solution, also when g=1.
Case III is entirely symmetric to case II, and the derivation of optimal transfers proceeds in
exactly the same way as above.
The transfers can hence be summarised as follows: If both spouses receive the same income in
period two no transfers are made. If B is employed and A becomes unemployed, A does not
pay any transfer to B. If g
q e e £
- - e
k( ) 2 1  altruism is so weak, that B does not make any transfer
to A either. If g
q e e >
- - e
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                                     (10)
Because of symmetry, the transfer is the same if roles are reversed, so TA=TB=T. Henceforth it
is implicitly assumed the spouses are effectively altruistic, i.e. g
q e e ‡
- - e
k( ) 2 1 , so that altruism
is strong enough to generate positive transfers according to (10) if one spouse is employed and
the other is unemployed. It is the presence of altruism that makes the couple willing to share11




> 0), and according to (10) the two
spouses split total earnings into halves if g=1, irrespective of who earns the money.
In period one, A (and B) maximises own expected utility EUA (EUB) and thereby decides how
much to save. T only depends on known parameters, and is therefore common knowledge al-
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The optimisation results in the following expression for savings:
s
y y p e p p e e p e
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The savings decision thus depends on the expected transfers and, due to symmetry, the solu-
tion is identical for both spouses, i.e. sA=sB=sm. Together (10) and (12) then give the follow-
ing expression for sm :
s
y y
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As was the case for the single individual, the first term represents consumption smoothing,
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so the smallest amount saved by a married person occurs when g=1. For precautionary saving
to be positive when altruism is present, it is hence sufficient that the expression within brack-
ets in (13) exceeds unity for g=1. That  p e p p e p e
k
k
k 2 2 2 1
1 2
2 2 1 1 1
-
- +
- + - + - >
q e
q e e
q e ( ) ( )
( )
 follows
immediately from Jensen’s inequality:
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The precautionary part of savings is hence positive also for a married individual. Empirical
findings by Merrigan & Normandin (1996) suggest that households with two income earners
are less prudent than households with only one income earner. This can also be shown theo-
retically:





sm < 0(as shown in (14)) the largest amount saved by a married person
arises for the smallest g allowed, i.e.g
q e e =
- - e
k( ) 2 1 . Inserting this value in (10) makes T=0, and
(13) then implies a savings rate identical to that chosen by the single individual in (3). For
higher values of g, T>0 and precautionary saving by the married person is lower. ￿13
Precautionary saving, and hence utility, is influenced by the degree of altruism via the ex-
pected transfers. The private part of the expected utility function (as well as total utility) for
both spouses would, however, be maximised if they agreed on always splitting total income
into halves, independent of the degree of altruism. This is shown by minimising the EPP with
respect to T:
EPP
p e p p e e p e
k k T k T k
=
+ - + + -
- - - - + - ln ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
q e q e q e q e
q
c h
,              (15)
where EPP is calculated in the same way as in Section 2. The first order condition becomes
¶
¶
q e q e
q e q e q e q e
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implying that both spouses have the same ”after-transfer” income. This is also the time con-
sistent transfer according to (10) when g=1, and it may be labelled the first-best marriage so-
lution, because it yields the highest possible expected utility within marriage.
Proposition 3: When g<1 the non- cooperative solution is inefficient compared with the first-
best marriage solution. However, the non-cooperative solution is always time consistent.
Proof: As shown above, the first-best solution ex ante occurs when both spouses agree on
splitting their total income into halves (T determined in (17)), regardless of the value of g.
This gives the smallest possible precautionary saving and maximises expected utility through14
a minimised EPP.
13 However, this solution is not time consistent when g<1. If, in period two,
one spouse is employed and the other is unemployed, the employed individual has an incen-
tive to deviate from such an agreement, and instead transfer the optimal amount determined in
(10). Because there are only two periods, there is no effective punishment in case of deviation,
and the time consistent transfer is always the one determined in (10). The more altruistic the




> 0). When g=1 the spouses always
split total income into halves, and the time consistent solution coincides with the first-best
solution. ￿
Furthermore I observe that:
Proposition 4: The savings response to a mean preserving increase in risk ( the parameter k)
is weaker for a risk sharing married person, than for a single one.
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where C p e p p e p e
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13 EPP determined in (15) combined with (17) gives the minimum EPP. Inserting time consistent transfers de-






m > 0 follows immediately from the definition of precautionary saving, but may also
be shown analytically.
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(20) is positive if and only if the expression within brackets is positive. The first parenthesis is
always positive, since  g g
1 2 1 2 2
/ / + ‡
- c h , e1<0 and e2>0. The second parenthesis takes on its
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value for the smallest g allowed, i.e. g
q e e =
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p
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0. Thereby the whole numerator, as well as the complete expression (18) is positive.16
smallest value for the smallest allowed value of g, i.e.g
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m - > 0. ￿
4   Different risks
There are gains from marriage in a situation as the one described above. When expected in-
come is equal for the spouses, both achieve higher expected private utility by sharing the risk.
But what happens if one party has a higher probability of experiencing bad luck, i.e. if one of
the spouses is a relatively bad risk? It is easy to show that altruistic risk sharing might still
make private utility for both of them higher within marriage than outside.
Assume the two spouses A and B still to be identical in terms of y1 and  y , but that they now
have different probabilities p of meeting the outcome e1 in period two. Assume pA>pB, and
that expected income in period two is still  y for B,  i.e. pBke1+(1-pB)ke2=0. Hence A has a
somewhat lower expected income in the second period. Consider the special case where hus-
band and wife maximise a joint utility function, i.e. they both have g=1 in their utility function17
(5).
15 Because they love each other as much as they love themselves, the two always split total
income into halves. It is hence total expected income within the family that is of importance
when they make their savings decisions in period one. Together with the assumption of equal
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Note, however, that because pAe1+(1-pA)e2<0,  y is no longer the joint expected income in
period two. Because B is risk averse, it may still be advantageous (in terms of private utility)
for him to share the risk with A, although such risk sharing decreases his expected income.
Denote the EPP that B would face as a single as EPPB. EPP within marriage, denoted EPPm is
the same for both spouses because g=1. The condition for the private part of expected utility
for B to be higher within than outside marriage is that
EPPB-EPPm>0              (23)
where  EPP
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Condition (23) is equivalent to:
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15 If g<1 there is no closed-form solution to the problem.18
If pA is not too high compared with pB, B’s expected private utility is hence higher when
sharing risk with A, than alone.
 16 From (24) the condition is:
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If the discrepancy between the probabilities pA and pB is not too large the risk-sharing effect
hence outweighs the decrease in expected income for B.
 For A private utility is always higher
within marriage than outside. Besides the risk-sharing effect, A’s expected income is also in-
creased because pA>pB. Because A has higher marginal utility from expected income than has
B, the redistribution from B to A that risk sharing implies, always makes total private utility
(for A+B)  higher when A and B are married to each other than when they both are single, re-
gardless of the values of pA and pB.
5   Social insurance
In most western countries public pensions and well developed insurance systems (whether
optional or compulsory) reduce the loss in case of unemployment, disability etc. This may
decrease the importance of precautionary saving. For instance, Engen & Gruber (1995) find
for the US, that unemployment insurance substantially crowds out precautionary savings.
There has, however, always been the case that many people have had the possibility of insur-
ing within the family, so that the introduction of social insurance may not have the expected
                                                
16 A parallel in the trade-union literature is Agell & Lommerud (1992), who conclude that risk averse workers
who have a relatively high probability of becoming skilled, prefer some wage compression between skilled and
unskilled workers, if the dispersion in skill probabilities is not too large.19
large effects. The crowding-out effects on precautionary savings from compulsory insurance
turn out to be smaller for risk sharing families than for singles.
Once again assume that agents are homogeneous, i.e. everyone faces the same probability p of
becoming unemployed in period two. Assume that the government provides a compulsory
insurance, with the compensation kq=kd (e2-e1), in case of period-two unemployment, where
the replacement ratio, d<1 makes uncertainty diminish, but not vanish, even with the compul-
sory insurance.
17 Note that the compensation, like the possible loss is inflated by the shift pa-
rameter k. Moreover, everyone has to pay a fair premium that makes the insurance break even.
This means that the premium paid by every individual in period one is pkq. For a single per-
son savings are now:
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where subscript I denotes insurance. Savings are obviously smaller than without the insurance
determined in (3), but the precautionary part of savings is still positive
18
                                                
17 In many western countries there really is a replacement ratio less than unity in case of unemployment, so this
assumption does not seem to be too farfetched.
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1   precautionary saving is positive also in presence of the com-
pulsory insurance.20
Now consider a married couple, where the spouses love one another as much as they love
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By comparing this with savings in absence of insurance determined in equation (28) (which
really is equation (13) where g=1), one can see that also savings by a married individual de-
cline when the insurance is introduced:
 s
y y
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Proposition 5: The effects on savings and welfare from a compulsory insurance are larger if
people are single, than if they are completely risk sharing couples.
Proof: Because EPP can be used to rank different uncertain states in terms of savings, the
welfare gain from the compulsory insurance can be expressed as EPP-EPPI, where EPP cor-
responds to the situation without, and EPPI  to the situation with insurance. Subscript m im-
plies a married person, so the comparison between the welfare gains for a single and for a
married person can be expressed as the ratio (EPP-EPPI)/(EPPm-EPPmI). If this ratio exceeds
unity the welfare gain from the compulsory insurance is larger for a single person, than for a
married one.
19
                                                
19 The discussion about savings effects is equivalent to that about welfare gains. The precautionary part of sav-
ings equals 2*EPP, so the ratios between differences in savings rates and between differences in EPP are identi-
cal.21
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Showing that this ratio exceeds unity is equivalent to showing that KN-LM>0. This proof is
performed in Appendix B.
If the aim of introducing the compulsory insurance is to increase social welfare by reducing
precautionary savings, the result hence differs whether one regards single people or couples.
The magnitude of the difference of course depends on parameter values, and a numerical ex-
ample, using (29), provides some intuition.
Assume the probability of becoming unemployed, p=0.1, the replacement ratio in the unem-
ployment insurance, d=0.75 and, for simplicity k=1. The model assumes the constant coeffi-
cient of absolute prudence, q to coincide with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, fol-
lowing the definition of absolute prudence given by Kimball (1990). When absolute risk aver-
sion is constant, the relative risk aversion, cq will vary over consumption levels c. The pa-
rameter q is chosen so as to provide some reasonable values of relative risk aversion evaluated22
at the average consumption level c .
20, 21 The welfare gain from introducing the insurance is
measured in terms of EPP, in the way discussed above. The ratio (EPP-EPPI)/(EPPm-EPPmI)
is presented in table 1 for some different values of average relative risk aversion cq , and
losses in case of unemployment e1.
Table 1: Comparing welfare gains from social insurance
cq e1 ( ) /( ) EPP EPP EPP EPP I m mI - -
3 - y /2 2.5
6 - y /2 2.6
6 - y /4 2.5
9 - y /2 2.2
If the average coefficient of relative risk aversion is 6, and the loss in case of unemployment is
half the expected income, the estimated gain from the compulsory insurance is more than two
and a half times as large if people are assumed to be single, compared with the gain when they
completely share the risk with a spouse. Although this numerical experiment is extremely
simplified, it indicates the importance of carefully studying the family structure, before draw-
ing any conclusions about the effects from, for instance, social insurance. A severe risk in
evaluating a project like this on individual basis, is that the gains may be overstated if intra-
family insurance is neglected.
                                                
20 I base the choice of q on the average relative risk aversion because we generally have a better idea of what
numerical value this coefficient should have than the coefficient of absolute prudence, although e.g. Merrigan &
Normandin (1996) have estimated this measure.
21 Assume  y y 1 = . This makes average consumption, c equal in both periods.23
6   Conclusion
This paper has shown that, besides the trivial fact that a single individual has smaller precau-
tionary saving than an individual who has access to intra-family insurance, altruism may actu-
ally enforce time consistent solutions regarding family risk sharing. In my model, binding
contracts are impossible to create, because there are no credible threats in case of deviation.
Instead it is altruism per se that makes the married couple willing to share risk. Because the
degree of altruism determines the extent of risk sharing, the solution is not necessarily ex ante
efficient. The highest expected utility occurs when spouses always split total income into
halves. This solution is, however, only time consistent when there is full altruism between the
two. If they love each other somewhat less than they love themselves, they instead share risk
to a somewhat smaller extent, thereby gaining somewhat lower expected utility.
A high degree of risk sharing within families also reduces the importance of social insurance,
which has also been concluded empirically by e.g. Engen & Gruber (1995).  If people are sin-
gle the welfare gain and the reduction in precautionary saving from the introduction of social
insurance are larger than if people have an intra-family insurance. A numerical example
shows that the difference may be substantial. This indicates the importance of studying what
the family structure in the economy looks like, before drawing any conclusions about e.g. wel-
fare gains. How large a fraction are single, and how large a fraction lives in families? It is also
desirable to find out to what extent risk really is shared within families, although this may be a
difficult empirical task.24
The theoretical model of how altruism may influence precautionary saving presented in this
paper of course has its limitations. Therefore some theoretical extensions naturally come to
mind. The exponential utility function, that is used throughout the paper, is itself quite restric-
tive, in that it assumes constant absolute risk aversion. More general functional forms would
therefore be desirable, but then analytical solutions are no longer available. Instead simula-
tions become necessary, which also means loss of generality. Besides more general functional
forms, another extension of the model could be to involve more than one generation in the
family, with altruism also between parents and children.  It would also be interesting to find
out what happens in presence of endogenous labour supply, where the individual is allowed to
accommodate labour supply when it becomes clear whether or not the spouse becomes unem-
ployed. There is hence a lot that can be done theoretically to better understand precautionary
saving and how it is influenced by the family.
Appendix A: The Equivalent Precautionary Premium (EPP)
Welfare effects are, throughout the paper, measured in terms of the Equivalent Precautionary
Premium (EPP), a measure first developed by Kimball (1990). It is defined as the certain re-
duction from the non-random income y in period two that has the same effect on the optimal
savings decision as the addition of the random  ~ y . A positive EPP indicates that the income
risk is equivalent to a reduced certain income. Hence it implies that utility is lower in the un-25
certain case than in the certain with the same expected income. For the same reason, the
higher is EPP, the lower is utility.  The mathematical definition of EPP is:
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where E is the expectations operator, u is the utility function, s is period-one saving, and
~ y k = e1 with probability p, and  ~ y k = e 2  with probability (1-p).
From the first-order condition of utility maximisation we know that the left-hand side equals
zero, so that optimal saving under uncertainty is:
s











1 2 ln ( )
q e q e
q
               (3)




y s y EPP s
= - -
- - - - + q q
q q
( ) ( ) 1






y s y EPP s = - + =
- - - - + ( ) ( ) 1 0,              (A3)
because left-hand side of (A1) equals zero. This gives the following expression for EPP:
EPP s y y = + - 2 1             (A4)
Because optimal saving with certain income  y EPP -  is identical to optimal saving with un-
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EPP is derived analogously throughout the paper, and it is always the case that EPP equals the
precautionary part of savings times two. For a married, altruistic individual, EPP is smaller
than for the single one, indicating that uncertainty does not affect utility for the married as26
much as it does for the single one. Note, that when calculating EPP in presence of social in-
surance, the uncertain state is compared with the certain where the insurance premium pkq (kq
is the compensation paid to the individual in case of period-two unemployment, which occurs
with probability p) is paid in period one and the expected amount pkq is paid back with cer-
tainty to the individual in period two.
The EPP measure can also be used to rank various uncertain states. A smaller EPP always
corresponds to smaller precautionary saving, and to a higher level of utility.
Appendix B: Proving Proposition 5
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and
q=d(e2-e1).
Below I show that  KN-LM>0. After some manipulation of (29), we see that
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In demonstrating the proof I rely on the fact that
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That the inequality (B2) holds is obvious when we consider the assumptions that e1<0, e2>0
and d<1. (B2) hence implies
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which, together with (B1), allows the following inequality:
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